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ABSTRACT: This article argues despite opportunities to
learn valuable strategic lessons from Denmark’s effort in the
Afghanistan War (2001–14), Danish civil authorities implemented
a comprehensive approach policy that failed to establish a bridge
to lessons learned by the military. Denmark’s experience in the
Afghanistan War demonstrates promises and perils of lessons
learned processes.

I

n the dynamic security environment of the post-Cold War era, the
small nation of Denmark has exploited its political-military agility to
craft distinct contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and argue that operational impact matters more than sheer size.1 The
so-called comprehensive approach to civil-military cooperation—the
Danish and NATO version of whole-of-government policy—is a
case in point. It was conceptualized during the Afghanistan campaign
as a way to shape all strategic, operational, and tactical lines of effort
into a multinational framework, and Denmark leveraged its tight-knit
government community centered in Copenhagen and its can-do, activist
strategic culture to be at the forefront.
Despite the promise of the comprehensive approach, however, the
civilian government failed to learn strategic lessons. This failure can
be attributed not least to the fact that the effort in Afghanistan was
overwhelmingly military, whereas the comprehensive approach policy
was civil-military. From the decision to deploy a battle group, and then
put it in command of a specific and difficult territory—the Nahr-e Saraj
district, comprising the commercial center, Gereshk, and part of the
green zone along the Helmand River—the military went all in, adapting
to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare.
Other government agencies and especially nongovernmental actors
have been less enthusiastic participants on the ground in Afghanistan.
The fact that the celebrated comprehensive approach worked better in
Copenhagen than in Helmand leads us to another source of failure,
namely, the limited energy a nation can derive from its self-image. Danish
officials like to convey that their country is a small, smart, and tough
country. Lessons learned processes likely to confirm this self-image tend
1     The author is grateful for the insightful comments from two anonymous Parameters reviewers;
to Sibylle Scheipers and Hew Strachan for inviting this contribution to an Afghanistan workshop
held in St. Andrews, Scotland, in January 2019; to Jens Ringsmose for constructive discussions; and
to Julie Homegaard Milland for valuable research assistance. Where reference is made to Danish
publications, the author has translated Danish titles into English.
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to gain political support, whereas processes that are likely to challenge
it do not.
Ultimately, Danish decisionmakers have proven unwilling to initiate
learning processes that challenge the country’s underlying culture of
informal and reactive leadership. Danish security and development
organizations have learned from the Afghanistan War, for sure, but as
Danish civil authorities have preferred to play to their own perceived
strengths while ignoring politically difficult issues, the overall result is
impoverished learning. The Danish case thus illustrates the promises
and pitfalls offered by lessons learned processes. Organizations need
them, but political masters struggle to define and connect them. To
paraphrase a US lessons learned inquiry, Denmark is a case study of
how easy it is to encounter lessons but how difficult it is to learn—
digest and implement—certain lessons, especially strategic ones.2
This article explores the Danish case of learning selective lessons,
tracing the interaction of national policy, military efforts, and the
comprehensive approach.

Political-Strategic Lessons

As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission
concluded in 2014, the political parties behind defense agreements,
which compose the large majority of parties across the political spectrum,
initiated a formal lessons learned process culminating in mid-2016 in a
set of three publicly available reports.3 But because this process focused
on comprehensive and coordinated action to stabilize fragile states, it
was not a comprehensive evaluation of Danish policy and Afghanistan
engagement but of a narrow facet of the effort.4
The first report, managed by the Danish Institute of International
Studies, a think tank under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Denmark (MFA), addressed the sum of international experiences with
comprehensive approaches (also known as whole-of-government or
defense, diplomacy, and development) to stabilization. It did not evaluate
Danish policy in particular. The second report, led by development
consultants hired by the MFA, explicitly addressed only the Danish
development aid to Afghanistan. The third report, managed by the Royal
Danish Defense College, assessed civil-military cooperation projects
managed by the Ministry of Defense. As civil-military cooperation is
a circumscribed set of activities, the report de facto dealt with a mere
€ 1.1 million of € 1,533 million in Danish military expenditures related
to Afghanistan—0.07 percent.
The limited scope of the report could be, at least in part, a reflection
of the political process of establishing the lessons learned mandate in the
2      Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), 4–5.
3      Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier (DIIS), Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 2001–2014, Report
1 (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2016); DIIS, Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 2001–2014, Report 2 (Copenhagen:
DIIS, 2016); DIIS, Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 2001–2014, Report 3 (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2016).
4      DIIS, Mandate for Lessons Learned Process (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2014).
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first place. Several issues plagued negotiations over the mandate, finally
adopted in November 2014 as ISAF was about to terminate its mission.
The left-wing Socialist People’s Party, part of the center-left government
majority, wanted a comprehensive assessment, but one that highlighted
the virtues of a comprehensive approach. Right-wing parties saw this
as critical of the military effort and were reluctant to support such a
comprehensive assessment. Partly for the same reasons, the parties split
on whether a lessons learned process should take place at all, and if so,
whether civil servants should run it or involve independent experts.
Consequently, the broad and independent format of the three lessons
learned processes did not really address Denmark. They were written by
independent consultants who were also recipients of ministry-controlled
development aid, suggesting the possibility of less-than-independent
findings. In military affairs, lessons were written in-house and concerned
an exceedingly small proportion of the civil-military cooperation effort.
Significant political concern regarding political-strategic lessons
learned from coalition conflicts in the early twenty-first century was
evident in a parallel process that began in June 2012 and concluded only
in February 2019. This process concerned the lawfulness of war in Iraq
and the handling of detainees in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The original
design of this parallel process aimed, in part, to hold accountable Danish
decisionmakers and officials who might have acted wrongfully.5
Comprised of parties that had opposed joining the Iraq War in 2003,
the center-left government that took office in October 2011 initiated
this political-legal search for justice. A judicial commission of inquiry
did proceed. But the effort was heavily politicized and undermined
support for a comprehensive mandate behind the aforementioned three
reports. Following a change of governments in June 2015, the judicial
commission was closed. In the spirit of consensus in May 2016, however,
the parties agreed to revive the commission but now as an historical
inquiry into “the decision-making processes” that led to Danish military
participation in interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.6
The revived but delimited inquiry of 2017–19 was mandated to
balance political sore spots: the decision to become involved in the
Kosovo conflict (1998–99), made by a left-wing government, and the
decisions to join the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, made by a right-wing
government. In theory, the blame would be spread equitably. Moreover,
the inquiry was limited to the process that led to Denmark’s decision
to use armed force, not the subsequent war itself, leaving a politically
convenient black hole of political-strategic learning.
The conclusions of the historical inquiry, in particular, amply
demonstrate the discrepancy between parties’ behavior when in
5      “Mandate for Inquiry into the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Danish Ministry of Justice
(MoJ), April 11, 2012.
6      MoJ, Agreement on Independent Historical Inquiry into Denmark’s Military Engagement in Kosovo, Iraq,
and Afghanistan (Copenhagen: MoJ, 2016).
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government and when in opposition.7 On the one hand, the inquiry
highlights the considerable degree to which shifting Danish governments,
rhetoric notwithstanding, have pursued foreign policy activism from the
same baseline—balancing support for the United Nations, the United
States, and NATO. On the other hand, it highlights how political games
result not only in the aforementioned discrepancy in behavior but also
reveal a dearth of formalized national security policy prioritization.
National security policy is developed and implemented informally and
adaptively, which keeps strategic issues fluid and allows Danish political
parties room for maneuver. The downside is a lack of a disciplining
framework to identify political-strategic priorities and draw lessons.
While dissent among political parties is normal in democracies, the
informal Danish political culture of domestic contest and competition
has proven stronger than the imperative to draw from and to embed
strategic lessons in a formal document of national security strategy.
The three aforementioned reports, along with the historical inquiry,
unsurprisingly, have not led to a course correction in strategic policy.
Rather they have fueled an ongoing game of political contestation. The
rationale of Danish decisionmakers—Denmark is better off reacting to
events—has limited value for political-strategic learning and indirectly
pushed the military, foreign policy, and development communities to
focus on lessons relevant for their particular domains but not necessarily
relevant beyond them. We shall explore each domain in turn.

Military Lessons

Denmark’s engagement in Afghanistan started in December 2001,
following a parliamentary decision to contribute aircraft and special
operations forces to the international coalition.8 Given the size of the
country, Denmark’s contribution grew to considerable proportions,
especially from 2008 to 2012, when the country deployed a battle group
to Helmand province. Today, engagement continues in the form of a
reduced training and capacity-building mission.
The Danish military effort in Helmand province was considerable,
sustained, and consistently enjoyed greater public attention than civilian
development aid, even as the latter increased along with the military
effort. In 2008, Danish annual development aid, both multilateral and
bilateral, to Afghanistan reached a level of € 65 million, which has largely
been sustained. Notably, Denmark did not shy away from “walking the
talk” as it deployed and sustained a military contribution beyond the
capacity of most other similar states. Militarily, Denmark deployed a
battle group to Helmand from 2008 to 2012, deployed a total of 18,376
personnel through the ISAF years, and sustained 43 casualties.
In January and February of 2006, the Danish government proposed,
and parliament made, a decision to deploy Danish troops to ISAF
7      Rasmus Mariager and Anders Wivel, Why Did Denmark Go to War? (Copenhagen: Rosendahls
a/s, 2019).
8      Danish parliament decision B 37, December 14, 2001.
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Regional Command South and in support of the British provincial
reconstruction team (PRT) in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province.9 With
this decision, Denmark shifted its profile from one of dispersal to one
of concentration, and it gained territorial responsibilities of its own in
the Nahr-e Saraj district.
Previously, Denmark had contributed around 50 troops for
ammunition and mine clearing in Kabul, 50 troops to the German
PRT in Feyzabad, 10 troops to the Lithuanian PRT in Chaghcharan,
and 6 troops to the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif. Politically, these
contributions reinforced Danish commitments to NATO and individual
NATO allies and partners. But beginning in 2006, Denmark shifted to
a lead role in the stabilization of a high-risk district.
Denmark rotated a total of 17 task force teams to Helmand
province. At its peak, from 2009 to 2011, each team was comprised
of approximately 700 personnel, and the Danish effort through the
ISAF years totaled nearly 20,000 personnel (see figure 1). The peak
years of dead and injured soldiers were likewise defined by the Helmand
campaign. Team 3 of 2007 lost 1 soldier. The next seven teams lost a
total of 34 soldiers before casualties declined well into 2011 (see figure 2).

Figure 1. Number of Danish soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, 2002–1710

Figure 2. Number of Danish soldiers deployed, killed, and injured in Helmand,
2006–1411
9      Danish parliament decision B 64, January 12, 2006.
10      Forsvarsministeriets Personalestyrelse, “Afghanistan,” May, 2019.
11      Forsvarskommandoen, “Danish soldiers in Helmand: Helmand Teams: Team 1 through
Team 17,” Danish Defence: Because Something Is Worth Fighting For, December 9, 2019.
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The adaptability of Danish forces is evident in this shift from
dispersed and protected deployment to the war effort in Helmand. Several
things are notable. One, the defense agreement of 2004 had a “first
in, first out” emphasis reflecting current thinking in the United States
and NATO on reaction forces and expeditionary warfare. Denmark did
organize a branch of its armed forces for international operations in the
early 1990s. But it was not until 2002, when NATO enlargement to the
Baltic states provided for a safe regional space, that the full Danish force
was geared to international operations.12 Danish land forces were then
organized into a standing first brigade for reaction and a second brigade
for training and mobilization.
The Helmand campaign undid this organizational design,
demanding a new design whereby sustaining a rotation of teams gained
priority over first in, first out. Battalions were preferred, and brigades
had no real function. Moreover, a deployed headquarters had to be
developed for the larger and more complex functional requirements of
territorial management. Finally, troops had to learn COIN warfare and
interact with the full range of civilian actors in the battle space.
Adaptability can likewise be found in the Helmand effort in
the shift from a dynamic, counterforce campaign to a more classical
clear-hold-build campaign fashioned around principles of COIN
warfare. While the distinction is relative, the period from 2006 to 2008
represents a highly dynamic facet of the campaign where Danish forces
joined the platoon house strategy of the British, got into the heaviest
fighting any Danish force had experienced since the German-Danish
War (1864), and ultimately deployed Leopard 2 main battle tanks from
Denmark to Helmand to deliver precision fire and generally dominate
the opponent. In the spring of 2009, Danish forces also participated
in Operation Panchai Palang, an offensive operation to gain control
of central Helmand. Still, by this time, a new US administration and
shift of ISAF command signaled a turn toward a less offensive, more
engaging COIN strategy.
Gradually, the Danish task force shifted from patrolling along the
Helmand River green zone to consolidating its presence in Gereshk
and partnering with the growing number of Afghan soldiers and police
forces in its area. Danish forces maintained a patrol base line in the
green zone. But from early 2012, gradually transferred responsibility
to Afghan forces. In fact, Operation Panchai Palang was intended to
clear key Taliban strongholds and enable this strategy of transitioning
to Afghan lead. Thus, in the operation’s wake, in the fall of 2009 and
early 2010, the forward operating bases were given Dari names. By
February 2012, Danish forces relinquished their commanding role to
focus on partnering and training. A special operations forces task force
deployed to Helmand in 2012 to accelerate capacity building among the

12      Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Sten Rynning, “Denmark: Happy to Fight, Will Travel,” International
Affairs 95, no. 4 (July 2019): 877–95.
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Afghan forces, leading to the unit’s first loss of life in an operation north
of Gereskh.
The army concluded its lessons learned process in March 2016 with
generic lessons applicable to deployments to Afghanistan, the Baltic,
or elsewhere:
• The military requires a mandate with a clear campaign plan, an
assessment of the capacity for force buildup in the mission area, a legal
framework for handling detainees and for employing local labor, a
memorandum of understanding and technical arrangements with host
and partner nations, and the integration of information operations in
army education.
• The military requires support for developing a full-spectrum
force capable of meeting unexpected circumstances, similar to the
aforementioned deployment of Leopard 2 battle tanks to Helmand
and the widespread introduction of tactical and subtactical drones for
surveillance and reconnaissance in Afghanistan, which also influenced
the post-Afghanistan force-on-force environment in Europe.
• Denmark requires an adjusted organization capable of better
synchronizing deployments with key allies and partners and capable
of deploying female engagement teams.
• The military education programs need to tailor staff officer education
to distinct institutional contexts of Denmark’s allies. Particularly, the
introduction of military English would support joint operations with
the United States and Britain. Enhancements should also include
a more stringent use of lessons learned processes and integrate the
home guard where applicable.
• Denmark requires fielding enough equipment for training and
deployment to meet such missions as those in Afghanistan as well as
ensuring redundant capacities for force-on-force scenarios in Europe.
• Denmark requires robust leadership capable of initiative and with the
ability to entice similar influence up and down the chain of command.
For context, Afghanistan was a company commander’s war, and
European defense and deterrence brings brigade-level leadership back
into focus.
• The military should tailor human resource policies to identify distinct
leadership profiles for training and capacity building in advance
of operations.
• The military should commit to maintaining six-month deployments to
preempt deployment fatigue. These efforts should reflect the uniquely
straining experience of sustaining task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
over several years.
• Denmark needs an operational and readiness culture that
institutionalizes and maintains the ability of troops to endure camp
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conditions by improving training facilities at home and by increasing
access to facilities in partner nations.
• Denmark should strive for a maximum level of interoperability with
allies, including close allies such as Britain, to align understanding
of comprehensive approaches like those used in Helmand province
more easily. This capacity should also lead to more proactive use of
liaison officers.13
As mentioned, the army lessons are formulated in generic terms and
concern its organizational, tactical, and operational issues. The army has
drawn lessons and shaped them to a changing security environment and
is now in the process of implementing—actually learning—the lessons.
As such, it is a promising case of lessons learned. Neither the government
nor parliament, however, has requested strategic lessons, thus weakening
civil-military integration and preventing critical dialogue on strategic
objectives, ways, and means in national decision-making.
As we saw, the official lessons mandate of 2016 deliberately excluded
the full military effort from the learning exercise, confining politicalmilitary learning to the very narrow civil-military cooperation sliver of
the campaign. We thus return to the particularities of Danish defense
policy-making. Parliament’s decisions regarding defense resource
allocations also function to define the primary tasks of the armed forces.
In mid-2012, as Denmark relinquished command of the Helmand task
force, the defense budget was cut by 15 percent, and the depth of the
battalion structure was reduced from six to three, precluding any type
of Afghanistan-style campaign, and instead, preparing the army for
European defense operations.
These cuts were thus enacted not in respect of lessons identified but
as a consequence of political fatigue with the Afghanistan campaign and
a desire to reduce the military footprint to the benefit of other government
programs. Later, in January 2018, as Denmark was confronted with
further NATO regional defense and deterrence demands, parliament
increased the budget 20 percent, reinforcing the type of brigade-size
autonomous capacity NATO was requesting.
These increases reflected strategic concerns—with Russian
aggressiveness and the imperative for allies to deliver on NATO’s
Defense Investment Pledge, the so-called two percent commitment (to
bring defense spending up to two percent of gross domestic product)—
but were not in any particular way connected to the military lessons
drawn from Afghanistan. These lessons, drawn just two years earlier in
2016, addressed crisis management operations as opposed to regional
defense and deterrence, and they lacked a connecting bridge to the
political realm of strategic lessons learned.
In sum, the army has drawn considerable tactical and operational
lessons, and parliament has shaped budgets and overarching priorities
13      Danish Army, Army Report on Ongoing Development of Force Contributions (Copenhagen: Danish
Army, 2016).
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to its liking. But strategy documents bridging the political and military
levels—a safeguard against a jumble of politics, policy, and wishful
thinking—are absent.14 While consistent with the Danish political
preference for informal and adaptive policy, it stands as a warning for
Denmark’s next employment of military force.

Comprehensive Approach Lessons

The comprehensive approach as a tool for coordinating and
integrating relevant actors and policies in support of stabilization has
been a Danish priority since 2003. But the comprehensive approach
policy has also become a malleable tool—both for demonstrating a
political desire for broad-based stabilization policy in an era of protracted
and politically contentious armed conflict and for actually offering
improvements in security, development, and governance on the ground.
The comprehensive approach is thus both aspirational—some would say
symbolic—and a policy tool. As such, it has gone through several phases
and is likely to continue to change.
Version 1.0 of the comprehensive approach evolved from 2003 to
early 2009. Denmark was a front-runner in placing “Concerted Planning
and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations,
or CPA,” as the idea was originally called, on NATO’s agenda.15 As
NATO deliberations slowed, however, so did implementing the approach
in Denmark where the key ministries—Foreign Affairs and Defense—
did not take ownership of the issue. Further, the key Danish military
effort in Iraq was not amenable to substantial civil-military coordination
on the ground on the outskirts of Basra. But the transition out of Iraq
from 2006 to 2007 and parallel entry into Helmand province offered
Denmark a fresh opportunity to engage the policy. In 2006, at its Riga
summit, NATO agreed to develop a comprehensive approach policy but
then needed to work out details and implications.
In the following years, the political momentum behind the
comprehensive approach increased, and Denmark spotted an opportunity
to be influential. Critically, a new US policy, based upon the US Agency
for International Development experience as it applied to comprehensive
conflict analysis, led to the United States establishing an interagency
system to manage contingencies.16 By August 2009, the United States
was able to present a fully integrated civil-military campaign plan for
Afghanistan.17 Inspired by this process, NATO adopted a substantial,
comprehensive approach policy in 2008, which included both generic
and Afghanistan-focused directives. Denmark was following suit, and a
preparatory commission delivered a framework policy of comprehensive
14      Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
15      Kristian Fischer and Jan Top Christensen, “Improving Civil-Military Cooperation the Danish
Way,” NATO Review, no. 2 (Summer 2005); and Peter Viggo Jakobsen, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach
to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress, DIIS Report 2008:15 (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008).
16      White House, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,
National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) (Washington, DC: White House, 2005), 1.
17      US Embassy, Kabul and US Forces Afghanistan, United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (US Embassy, Kabul and US Forces Afghanistan, 2009).
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and integrated action that informed parliament’s 2009 defense agreement
for 2010 to 2014.18 In 2010, NATO allies agreed to put crisis management
on par with collective defense tasks in the Strategic Concept, formalizing
the window of opportunity for small allies to seek outsized influence on
Allied affairs.19
To gain it, Denmark had to shift course. Version 1.0 of the
comprehensive approach policy had become characterized by grand
ambition and poor implementation. Policy development took place in
the MFA by designated personnel from the ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Defense under the guidance of a ministerial oversight team. The
intention was to set up an MFA Stabilization Department modeled on
the British Stabilization Office. In the interim, the team pursued its
mandate to generate projects for the comprehensive approach as it applied
primarily to Afghanistan, but also to East Africa, and include these
projects in the Helmand plans and other official strategy documents of
Denmark. While well-intentioned, this setup failed to deliver a unified
policy platform for the political parties in parliament and instead got
mired in a range of bureaucracy and organization that de facto impeded
interdisciplinary planning and action.
Sensing a moment of opportunity, Denmark turned to version 2.0 of
its approach. It benefited from the establishment of the aforementioned
Stabilization Department in August 2009, the political energy that flowed
from the US-led surge in Afghanistan, and the commitment of allies such
as Denmark to follow suit. Thus, the new department could focus on
the development of an ambitious, comprehensive approach concept that
integrated military, civilian government, and nongovernmental actors in
a single policy framework in the context of hostile armed conflict.
The diplomat who ran the Stabilization Department during the critical
opening years from 2009 to 2010, Rolf Holmboe, pinpoints a number
of factors that allowed Denmark to help shape NATO’s comprehensive
approach policy in Afghanistan. First, comprehensiveness began in
the political arena where a broad majority in parliament supported
comprehensive foreign policy priorities and the full chain of command.
Second, a culture of cooperation and trust had gradually emerged among
the two key ministries and the defense command. Third, Denmark was
both small and smart—it benefited from its tightly knit informal network
among senior civil servants and managed to maintain its culture of high
trust. This enabled coherent policy initiative in multilateral negotiations.
In short, Denmark had a firm idea of where to go (comprehensive
approach policy) and was liberated from “policy mafias”—pursuing
sectarian issues such as development or military security—that, in
Holmboe’s experience, characterize larger countries such as Britain and
the United States and complicate negotiation mandates.20
18      Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD), Danish Defense Agreement (Copenhagen: MoD, 2009).
19      NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010).
20      Rolf Holmboe, interview by the author, January 23, 2019.
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This Danish moment of policy shaping influence could only last
as long as the surge in Afghanistan. Beginning in 2013, Denmark
had to consider if version 3.0 of comprehensive approach policy fit a
non-Afghan centric world. Distinctively smaller in scale and ambition,
Version 3.0 shifted the center of gravity from crisis management to
crisis prevention. Similar policy debates within Allied governments
and the United Nations centered on nebulous concepts of stabilization,
resilience, and the need to counter violent extremism. Danish policy
calls for a much smaller military footprint largely related to capacity
building, and thus training of local security forces. It does not aim to
coordinate development policy with nongovernmental, humanitarian
actors.21 Version 3.0 is thus distinctively civilian and governmental.
Revealingly, the 2018–23 defense agreement entered in January
2018 does not at any point refer to “comprehensive approach” but
rather to capacity building. Moreover, humanitarian organizations
are kept separate from the military effort.22 The aid and development
community was always skeptical of tight coordination and cooperation
with the military on the ground and felt affronted by the ambitious policy
outlined from 2009 to 2011.23 As Holmboe puts it, MFA policy today
aims to separate humanitarian work from ministry-led development
and governance efforts, leaving that work to nongovernmental and
private organizations.24
Current MFA policy is less ambitious and high-minded than during
the peak ISAF and COIN years in Afghanistan: it is not captured in
one learning document, like in the army, but spread throughout various
policy documents related mostly to African crisis-prevention efforts.
While the MFA continues its efforts on the ground, only in a narrower
MFA framework, does the political level seem content to wave the
symbolic flag of comprehensiveness in Danish policy and claim the
mantle of balanced foresight into conflict prevention, as opposed to war
and armed conflict. As should be clear from this discussion, though,
the Danish comprehensive approach policy has gone through both
armed and unarmed phases and is today distinctively less comprehensive
compared to version 2.0. Denmark’s engagement in conflict areas
remains, as always, dependent on support from allies and partners.

Conclusion

In March 2012, then Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal argued in an
op-ed that now was the time for Denmark to once again think and act
like a small state. According to his sentiments and those of the left-wing
government that took office in October 2011, Denmark had veered too
21      Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice, Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement
in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World (Copenhagen: Danish Government, 2013).
22      MoD, Defense Agreement 2018–2023 (Copenhagen: MoD, 2018).
23      Astri Suhrke, When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2012); Peter Gill, Today We Drop Bombs, Tomorrow We Build Bridges: How Foreign Aid
Became a Casualty of War (London: Zed Books, 2016).
24      Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice, Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement.
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far in the direction of military and strategic activism, beginning in Iraq
and continuing in Afghanistan, and had lost sight of a wider and softer
engagement favoring international rules and institutions. Consequently,
the 2013–17 defense agreement cut the defense budget by 15 percent.
In September 2015, a few months after taking office, the right-wing
government commissioned a seasoned diplomat, Peter Taksøe-Jensen,
to sort out Danish foreign policy and security priorities in order to put
the spotlight on Danish national interests. According to this perspective,
Denmark had closed one chapter on ambitious Afghanistan-style
crisis management policy and another on social-liberal and neutralist
foreign policy with a cosmopolitan flavor. Instead, Denmark needed
to recommit to strategic activism, bolster its commitment to national
and allied defense, such as that of Greenland and the Baltics, and avoid
overstretch. As a result, the 2018–23 defense agreement increased the
defense budget by 20 percent.
Political leadership matters for large states and small. In the
Danish case, the scope for such leadership was always contextual. In
Afghanistan, counterterrorist policy, detainees, and civilian casualty
policy divided parliament, and thus inhibited leadership. Meanwhile,
stabilization and support for Afghan development enjoyed widespread
support and emboldened it. Thus, the comprehensive approach became
a rallying cry on the Danish political scene because it served to build
consensus and move the country beyond the divisiveness of the Iraq War
(2003–11) more than it served as a tool for coordinated action on the
ground. Therefore, the comprehensive approach served as a symbolic
framework within which Danish political interests could come together
and claim leadership.
All countries experience partisan politics. But in the Danish case,
it has resulted in a peculiar type of informal national decision-making
that bolsters flexibility for the top echelon of the government and
enables political blame games in the electoral arena. There is obvious
political convenience in this, but a major drawback of informality is that
it effectively breaks the political-strategic learning process that renders
strategic ambitions, ways, and means explicit and anchors them in
documents that pull in, rather than pull apart, political-military lessons.
The military, as well as the development community, did the heavy
lifting in Afghanistan and have drawn separate lessons. The army, which
bore the brunt of the hardship in the ISAF mission, has identified a range
of tactical and operational lessons it is now pursuing in a new framework
of both regional defense and deterrence and continued international
operations. The development community and thus the MFA inherited
the celebrated comprehensive approach policy and reduced it to a mostly
diplomacy-development engagement for preventing crises, primarily in
Africa, from escalating. As such, Denmark has learned some selective
lessons and steered clear of others. This application has helped the
country move forward but also exposed it to new risks.
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